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ELIMINATING SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS
ACTIONS UNDER THE RADAR
Barbara Black*
At least since Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the business
community and many influential scholars have challenged
the existence of the securities fraud class action on a variety of
grounds. Recently, two proposals have been advanced to "fix"
the problem of "abusive" securities fraud class actions. One
proposal requires arbitration of all securities fraud actions;
the other eliminates the corporate defendant in most actions.
Proponents assert that shareholders should have the right to
adopt these proposals through amendment of the company's
certificate of incorporation. Both these proposals have
attracted more than academic interest. In reality, adoption of
either proposal would substantially curtail, if not eliminate,
the securities fraud class action.
Part II of this paper first reviews the two rationales -
compensation and deterrence- for the federal securities class
action, sets forth the critics' principal arguments as to why
these goals are not achieved, and argues that the post-PSLRA
securities fraud class action is reasonably effective in
achieving both compensatory and deterrence goals. Part III
then describes the two proposals. Part IV explains why these
proposals are impermissible under the anti-waiver clause,
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Part V
explains why these proposals are also, under state law,
illegal, unfair to shareholders that do not vote in favor of
them, and unenforceable as to future stock purchasers. Part
VI concludes by calling for a national debate on the future of
the securities fraud class action. The arguments for and
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against the securities fraud class action involve complexities
and uncertainties that make "quick and dirty" solutions like
these two proposals inappropriate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The attacks on the securities fraud class action never end.
At least since Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,1 the business
1 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Indeed, the attacks on the class action
generally, and the securities fraud class action specifically, go back to the
1966 amendments to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
expanded the scope of the federal class action. See, e.g., AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure III (1972)
(quoting a trial judge who referred to the class action device as "an engine
of destruction" and a law professor who described it as "legalized
No. 3:802]
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community and many influential scholars have challenged
its continued existence on a variety of grounds. Even
substantial congressional reform to cure perceived abuses, in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)2 and again in the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), did not satisfy its critics
who assert that "the system is broken."4 Recently, two
proposals have been advanced to "fix" the problem of
"abusive" securities fraud class actions; in reality, adoption
of either proposal would substantially curtail, if not
eliminate, the securities fraud class action. One proposal
requires arbitration of all securities fraud actions (the
"arbitration proposal");5 the other eliminates the corporate
defendant in most actions (the "proposal to eliminate the
corporate defendant").6 Proponents assert that shareholders
should have the right to adopt these proposals through
amendment of the company's certificate of incorporation.
Both these proposals have attracted more than academic
interest. Prior to the financial meltdown and Madoff scandal
that currently command the agency's attention, it was
rumored that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was considering a change in its policy that would
blackmail"). For an early defense of rule 23, see Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REv. 664 (1979).
2 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78(a) et seq. (2006)).
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION i (July 2008) (calling for congressional reform of
private securities class actions).
5 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 96-102 and A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class
Action Reform, 2007-2008 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 217, 248-55.
Professor Pritchard describes the proposal as a "partial waiver of the fraud
on the market (FOTM) presumption;" this technical description, however,
masks its wide-ranging effect.
[Vol. 2009
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permit companies to require arbitration of investors' claims.7
More recently, a shareholder of a public corporation
submitted a preliminary proxy statement to the SEC to
solicit fellow shareholders for adoption of the proposal to
eliminate the corporate defendant. I
Debate about the securities fraud class action is healthy.
Radical change of an important investor protection
mechanism, however, is such an important policy matter
affecting our securities markets that the debate should take
place in the national spotlight. Congress, the courts, and the
SEC are all important participants that should be in the
forefront of this debate. The SEC is the "investor's
advocate,"9  charged with the responsibility to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation.' The Supreme Court and
Congress have, over the years, engaged in an ongoing
7 Kara Scannell, SEC Explores A Wider Role for Arbitration - Agency
May Consider Letting Firms Head Off Lawsuits by Investors, WALL ST. J.
Apr. 16, 2007, at Al. Although then Chairman Cox testified before
Congress that no such policy was pending before the Commission, rumors
persisted. See Nicholas Rummell, SEC and Congress gang up on
arbitration, FIN. WEEK, (July 23, 2007) available at
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070723/REG/7
0720028/-lFWIssueAlert0l&template=printart.
8 A shareholder of Alaska Air Group, Inc. submitted a shareholder
proposal under SEC Rule 14a-9 to adopt Professor Pritchard's proposal.
Management refused to include the proposal in the management's proxy
statement, and the SEC issued a no-action letter that management could
exclude the proposal for noncompliance with Rule 14a-8(c). See Alaska Air
Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 829060, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2009).
9 See SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct.
3, 2009) (describing the SEC's role).
10 SEC, supra note 9. In August 2007, a group of influential law
professors called on the SEC to take a leadership role on these issues.
Letter to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox from Professor Donald C.
Langevoort et alia (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.thelOb-
5daily.com/archives/Chairman%20Cox%20SEC%2OLetter.pdf. Chairman
Cox announced the SEC would hold roundtable discussions, but it has not
yet done so. See Kara Scannell, SEC to Study Revamp on Shareholder
Suits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2007, at C2.
No. 3:8021
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dialogue over the scope of the securities fraud class action.11
Recently, the Court expressed the view that Congress is the
dominant voice in this exchange in light of its recent
extensive legislative involvement in this area; 2 nevertheless,
the Court maintains a significant role in interpreting and
implementing Congressional policy. While the policymakers
certainly should solicit and take into account investors' views
on the benefits and costs of securities fraud class actions,
curtailment of the federal securities class action is not an
issue of shareholder rights that should be decided through
the e-proxies of individual corporations3
Part II of this paper first reviews the two rationales -
compensation and deterrence - for the federal securities
class action, sets forth the critics' principal arguments as to
why these goals are not achieved, and argues that the post-
PSLRA securities fraud class action is reasonably effective in
achieving both compensatory and deterrence goals. Part III
then describes the two "self-help" proposals1 4 to curtail
securities fraud class actions. Part IV explains why these
" See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In
Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293 (1999) (advocating a judicial approach that weighs policy
objectives identified by Congress).
12 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148 (2008); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
321-22 (2007).
" Shareholder voting, particularly voting by retail investors, has
dropped significantly at corporations that have adopted the notice and
access model that dispenses with the requirement that corporations mail
proxy statements to all investors. See Luis A. Aguilar, SEC
Commissioner, Speech on Increasing Accountability and Transparency to
Investors (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spch02O6O9laa.htm.
14 Professor Jean Sternlight calls provisions in consumer contracts
that bar class actions the "do it yourself' approach to law reform. As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11 (2000). See also Richard A.
Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1902 (2006) (identifying
the problem of class arbitration waivers that operate to repeal private
enforcement).
[Vol. 2009
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proposals are impermissible under the anti-waiver clause,
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act).'" Part V explains why these proposals are
also, under state law, illegal and may also be unfair to
shareholders that do not vote in favor of them and
unenforceable as to future stock purchasers. Part VI
concludes by calling for a national debate on the future of the
securities fraud class action. There is no easy answer to the
future of the federal securities fraud class action. The
arguments for and against it involve complexities and
uncertainties that make "quick and dirty" solutions like
these two proposals inappropriate.
II. THE DEBATE OVER SECURITIES FRAUD
CLASS ACTIONS
In the typical secondary market securities fraud claim,
the corporation introduces intentional misstatements into
the market that artificially inflate the stock price, so that
purchasers of the stock during the period of the fraud pay an
inflated price for the stock. 6 The corporation's fraud thus
causes injury to purchasers when the corrective information
reaches the market and the stock price drops. 7 In the
typical case, where the corporate defendant does not sell the
securities during the period of the fraud, the corporation
causes harm, but does not benefit directly from it, since the
fraud does not increase the corporation's assets (although
corporations benefit in many real ways from their stock's
increased market value).'"
1' 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006).
16 The situation where the corporation makes misstatements that
depress the stock price and result in sellers during the period of the fraud
receiving less than they otherwise would have, is far less common,
although it was the fact pattern in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
'7 See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
's As one example, corporations with a certain amount of market
capitalization benefit from streamlined registration requirements under
the Securities Act of 1933. Form S-3, General Instructions I.B.1 (Form S-3
No. 3:802]
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Because "[tihe overriding purpose of our Nation's
securities laws is to protect investors and to maintain
confidence in the securities markets,"19 Congress, the Court
and the SEC have long recognized that the securities fraud
class action is "an indispensable tool"2" that allows defrauded
investors to recover at least some portion of their losses.
Moreover, because securities fraud undermines overall
investor confidence in the securities market, Congress, the
Court, and the SEC have also acknowledged the importance
of the securities fraud class action as a necessary
supplement to the SEC's enforcement efforts.21 Thus, as
described by Professor James Cox, the class action has a
"quasi-public character."22
In order to facilitate securities fraud class actions, the
Supreme Court, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,23 adopted the
"fraud on the market" (FOTM) presumption of reliance in
efficient markets so that plaintiffs did not have to establish
can be used in primary offerings by registrants with $75 million float),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-3.pdf.
19 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on
H.R. 1058 (Joint Explanatory Statement) at 31, reprinted in 2
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 (104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1995).
20 Id. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005)
(stating that private actions are available to protect investors against
losses caused by fraud). See also Edward Labaton, Consequences, Intended
and Unintended, of Securities Law Reform, 29 STETSON L. REV. 395, 401
n.43 (1999) (setting forth testimony of SEC Chair Richard C. Breeden that
private actions are necessary to compensate defrauded investors).
21 See Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (stating that private securities fraud
actions serve to deter fraud); Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (1988) (stating that
the Rule 10b-5 private claim constitutes an essential tool for enforcement
of the 1934 Act). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)
(stating that private enforcement of proxy rules is a necessary supplement
to SEC action); Joint Explanatory Statement at 31 (stating that private
suits "help to deter wrongdoing"); Labaton, supra note 20 at 401 n.43
(setting forth testimony of SEC Chair Richard C. Breedon that private
actions augment SEC enforcement resources and provide additional
deterrence).
22 James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 497, 497 (1997).
23 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
COL UMBIA BUSINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2009
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their own reliance on the fraudulent statement; rather, in
efficient markets "all information known to the public affects
the price and thus affects every investor."24 As a result of the
Basic presumption, individual issues of reliance do not
defeat class action certification so long as the securities are
traded in an efficient market, and securities fraud class
actions increased in number. 5
After Basic, the business community and many scholars
charged that plaintiffs' attorneys brought too many
unmeritorious securities fraud class action suits in pursuit of
quick settlements and substantial attorneys' fees.26 In
response, Congress enacted PSLRA in 1995.27 Business
interests urged Congress to eliminate the FOTM
presumption of reliance,2" without which securities fraud
class actions would be difficult if not impossible to maintain.
The SEC opposed the elimination of the FOTM
presumption, 29 however, and Congress decided not to do so.
24 Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004). Belief
in the efficiency of markets is also a core aspect of the SEC's regulation of
disclosure. Seasoned issuers, for example, can use Form S-3 to register
securities and incorporate by reference information contained in Exchange
Act filings, Item 12 (Incorporation of Certain Information by Reference),
Form S-3, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-3.pdf.
21 Securities class actions have averaged between 47% and 48% of all
class actions in recent years. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implication, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539-40 (2006).
26 Professor Alexander wrote an influential law review article on this
issue. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). Two
leading securities professors rejected Professor Alexander's thesis because
of the small size of her sample (6 settlements). and her calculation of
allowable damages. See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARv.
L. REV. 438, 453 (1994); Cox, supra note 22, at 503-04.
27 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78(a) et seq. (2006)).
28 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 664-65
(3d ed. 2003).
29 Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce,
No. 3:802] SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER THE RA DAR 809
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Instead, PSLRA sought to weed out frivolous suits through a
variety of procedural and other measures. ° Congress chose
not to eliminate the securities fraud class action, but to cure
it and thus confirmed its importance to the integrity of the
U.S. capital markets. 1 Consistent with the Congressional
purpose, the Supreme Court identified PSLRA's twin goals:
"to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims."32  In
1998, Congress reaffirmed the national importance of the
reformed federal securities fraud class action and enacted
SLUSA, which preempted most class actions filed under
state common law and state securities statutes.3
The business community's campaign against the
securities fraud class action has not abated since the
enactment of PSLRA and SLUSA, even in the face of
persistent widespread corporate fraud, including the Enron-
era accounting frauds that led to the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the stock options
backdating scandals of 2005-06. They make the same pre-
PSLRA warnings that securities class actions present "a
serious threat to the health of the U.S. economy" and the
same pre-PSLRA arguments that "the culture of abusive
class actions" is "driven by a multibillion-dollar plaintiffs'
104th Cong. 203 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) (opposing proposal to eliminate the FOTM
presumption both because it would be contrary to SEC's disclosure
regulation and because it would make it "virtually impossible" for
investors to assert claims as part of a class action).
30 Among its procedural hurdles, PSLRA imposes heightened pleading
requirements for scienter and a stay on discovery pending resolution of a
defendant's motion to dismiss. The statute also requires court
appointment of a "lead plaintiff," presumptively the largest shareholder
willing to serve. For a brief description of the key provisions, see DONNA
M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 9-10 (2d ed. 2008).
31 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730730.
" Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309
(1997).
31 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
[Vol. 2009
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lawyer industry. '8 4  In addition, the business community
asserts that the prevalence of private securities litigation
places U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage and
deters foreign businesses from entering the U.S. securities
markets.3 5 Finally, according to its critics, there is no need
for private litigation; the SEC and other regulators have the
power not only to enforce the securities laws but also to
recover compensation for investors. 6  The business
community's concerns have found a receptive audience in the
Court; the majority opinion in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.37 recited all of them
as reasons to restrict the scope of liability in private Rule
10b-5 suits.
Many scholars also challenge the continued existence of
the securities fraud class action on a related series of
arguments grounded in finance theory that call into question
both the class action's compensatory and deterrence
functions.3 They assert that the securities fraud class action
does not perform its compensatory function well because
investors do not receive very much compensation. Cases
31 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION, at i (2008).
15 See id.; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE
REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 28-31 (2007); Michael R. Bloomberg, City of New York,
and Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
U.S. GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 73-77 (Jan. 23, 2007)
(hereinafter Bloomberg-Schumer Report); COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 72, 74-84 (Nov. 30, 2006) (hereinafter
Interim Report).
36 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 34, at iii.
For a description of the Fair Fund provision and a critique of the business
community's arguments, see Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be A
Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW. 317, 325-27,
337-39 (2008).
31 128 S. Ct. 761, 772-73 (2008).
31 While the following discussion is abbreviated and does not attempt
to explore all the nuances of these complex and interrelated arguments, I
believe it fairly sets forth the positions of those who doubt the
compensatory and deterrence rationales.
No. 3:802]
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typically settle for a small percentage of investors' losses,
and a significant portion of the settlement goes to payment of
costs, including attorneys' fees;39 accordingly, they believe
that it is not worth the high cost to produce such paltry
returns to the investor. If this is a serious concern, then
increases in the amounts of settlements should be evidence
of the success of the securities fraud class action rather than
of its failure, as critics view it. 4" Moreover, this argument
has general applicability to all class actions.41
Other arguments discounting the compensation rationale
focus specifically on the securities fraud class action. Unlike,
for example, a defective product class action in which the
corporation pays damages to users of the product for harm
caused by the product, in a securities fraud class action the
corporation pays damages to some of its current
shareholders who purchased the stock at the inflated price.
Thus, they argue, to the extent there is shareholder identity,
paying plaintiffs for their damages is simply an expensive
"pocket-shifting."42 While this is true, the cost to the current
shareholders may be less than the benefit to those same
shareholders if a significant amount of the settlement is
funded by insurance (which is usually the case)43 or by
31 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1545 (stating that "from a
compensatory perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable that the
securities class action performs poorly"). See also Janet Cooper Alexander,
Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1500 (1996) (arguing the current system fails to effectively compensate
class members).
40 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 4. at ii (noting
that, excluding billion dollar-plus settlements, the average 2007
settlement increased approximately 43% from 2006). The average value of
settlements fell in 2008, from $62.7 million to $31.2 million. Stephen Taub
& Roy Harris, Class-action Values Plunging, but Not for Long, CFO.com,
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/13277439.
41 Congress gave many examples of class action settlements that did
not give class members meaningful compensation in the legislative history
of the Class Action Fairness Act. See S. Rep. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15-20 (109th Cong., 1st Sess. 2005).
42 Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1556.
4' The vast majority of securities claims settle within or just above the
limits of the corporation's D&O coverage. See Tom Baker & Sean J.
COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2009
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payments from individual or third-party defendants (which
is usually not the case). 44
Finally, the critics argue that investors have a less costly
method of protecting themselves against losses caused by
securities fraud. If investors have a diversified portfolio,
over the long term, they will be on both sides of a securities
fraud - buyers who have suffered a loss and sellers who
reaped a benefit, because of a corporate fraud.45 Indeed,
under this theory, a diversified investor will be
overcompensated if it gets a recovery in a class action for its
losses and does not have to account for its gains in other
instances. The power of a diversified portfolio to net losses
and gains over time has become an article of faith among
academics, despite the fact there is little empirical evidence
to support it.46  Under this view, taking money from the
corporation, and ultimately its current shareholders, and
giving it to another group of investors (some of whom may be
one and the same), with the attendant "waste" of a
Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 761 (2009).
" Why defendants other than the issuer seldom pay is discussed infra
notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
4' Early expression of this point was made in Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 641 (1985). Later expressions include Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623,
639-40 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 639, 646-47 (1996). See also Coffee, Jr.,
supra note 25, at 1545.
46 One empirical study, funded by the U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform, found that large institutional investors generally break
even from their investments in common stock impacted by fraud
allegations and are often overcompensated as a result of litigation. Anjan
V. Thakor, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
20 (2005). Another study points out limitations in the U.S. Chamber study
and finds that many diversified institutional investors suffer significant
net losses from securities fraud over a ten-year period. Alicia Davis Evans,
Are Investors' Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal Over Time?
Some Preliminary Evidence (Jan. 27 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1121198.
No. 3:802]
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significant portion being paid in attorneys' fees and other
costs, is unnecessary to compensate shareholders for their
losses. Some scholars even argue that, just as contract law
requires victims of contract breaches to take reasonable
efforts to mitigate their losses, so too the securities laws
should not protect unreasonable investors who fail to
diversify.47 Indeed, some influential academics routinely
dismiss compensation as a rationale for the securities fraud
class action.48
Academic dismissal of the compensatory function
contrasts sharply with the attitude of Congress and SEC,
who have advanced compensation as a value in SEC
enforcement actions since the inclusion in SOX of the Fair
Fund provision that gives the SEC the authority to
distribute civil penalties to fraud victims.49  With the
exception of attorneys' fees, the arguments against the
compensation rationale apply equally to Fair Fund
distributions, yet the amount of publicity that the agency
generates for its distribution of Fair Funds reflects its
judgment that compensation remains important to many
investors. Should Congress and the SEC simply explain to
investors that compensation is not a worthy goal of securities
regulation?
Deterrence has been an equally important rationale for
the securities fraud class action in recognition of the limited
resources of the SEC and other regulators to enforce the
securities laws.5 ° Indeed, the Court has more frequently
" See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action
as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 10 (2007).
48 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on
the Market, 2009 WIs. L. REV. 151, 165 (referring to critical scholars). See
also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 237, 280-81 (2009) (arguing that the issuer of securities should not
be liable to losing shareholders for securities fraud).
" See Black, supra note 36, at 341.
'o See Labaton, supra note 20 and accompanying text. The deterrence
function of class actions generally came under attack in the enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), most prominently in the
Senate Report, which states that the "concept of class actions serving as
private attorney general is illegal." S. Rep. 109-14, at 59 (2005), reprinted
COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2009
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identified deterrence than compensation as the rationale. 1
Scholars debate how effectively securities fraud class actions
deter corporate fraud.52 Some scholars worry about over-
deterrence. 3 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel were
the first to articulate this concern. 4 They build on the
observation that, in every transaction where the stock price
is inflated by fraud, there is a purchaser that suffered a loss
and a corresponding seller who profited from the fraud. 5 In
the typical case, moreover, where the corporate defendant is
not selling shares during the period of the fraud, the
securities fraud does not increase the corporation's assets,
although corporations benefit in many real, if indirect, ways
from an increased market capitalization. Thus, they argue,
requiring the corporation to pay the total out-of-pocket
(OOP) losses" of the buyers makes the defendant pay for
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 55. For a post-CAFA defense of the deterrence
value of class actions, see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Expanding
the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006).
51 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
52 Scholars who have recognized the deterrence value include
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 651-52; Cox, supra note 22, at 513; and
Alexander, supra note 39, at 1510-11. Professor Coffee believes significant
reform is required to achieve deterrence. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at
1536-37. Professors Arlen and Carney argue that the goal of optimal
deterrence is not achieved. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney,
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Cases: Theory and Evidence,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992). Professors Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
argue that the practices of D&O insurers diminish deterrence. See Tom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:
The Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1817-18
(2007).
53 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 45, at 646 (describing OOP
damages as "excessive and dysfunctional"); Alexander, supra note 39, at
1496 (arguing that aggregate amount by which class members overpaid
does not represent the true social cost of the violation).
s See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 612, 640.
s See id. at 635. The assumption is that it would be both unfair and
impracticable to require innocent sellers to disgorge their profits.
56 OOP losses is the standard measure of damages in securities fraud
class actions. See Langevoort, supra note 45, at 646.
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more harm that it caused; indeed, focusing solely on trading
losses,57 the fraud has caused no damage. Significantly,
Easterbrook and Fischel do not say that damages are zero;
they recognize that there are other losses such as confidence
in the trading markets. 8
Is it truly possible that fraud can be overdeterred? Rule
10b-5 claims require proof of scienter,59 and, since PSLRA,
plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with [scienter]" 6 ° to
survive a motion to dismiss, and they must do so without the
benefit of discovery. 1  Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel
concluded that so long as liability was confined to truly
egregious acts, OOP damages were acceptable.62  Later
scholars doubt that liability is sufficiently limited63 and
argue that less voluntary corporate disclosure, and other
adverse effects, may be a consequence of securities fraud
class actions. 4
I believe, however, that after PSLRA, under-deterrence is
a more serious concern than over-deterrence. PSLRA's
tightened pleading standards and bar on discovery prior to a
motion to dismiss65 mean that, combined with the short
statute of limitations the Court legislated in Lampf Pleva,
" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 639.
58 Id. at 641.
" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 308 (2007).
61 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). In addition, to plead scienter
against a corporate defendant, a plaintiff must raise a strong inference
that someone whose intent can be imputed to the corporation acted with
scienter. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital
Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008).
62 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 644.
' See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 45, at 644 (stating that scienter
and materiality are too indeterminate). See also Alexander, supra note 39,
at 1489 (arguing that compensatory damages are not an efficient deterrent
because, among other reasons, there is too much uncertainty associated
with the measure of damages).
64 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 45, at 652-53.
65 See NAGY ET AL. supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson66 and Congress only
slightly expanded in SOX,67 plaintiffs' attorneys may lack
sufficient time to uncover enough evidence to persuade a
court that fraud has occurred. Moreover, both supporters
and detractors of the securities fraud class action agree that
under the current system (where the corporate defendant
generally pays all of the settlement through insurance while
individual defendants rarely pay anything), there is
insufficient deterrence for corporate managers and outside
participants to refrain from committing securities fraud.6"
Unfortunately, imposing personal liability on the
perpetrators of the fraud, although it would enhance
deterrence, is unlikely to become a common practice both for
reasons of legal theory69 and expediency." Is the solution to
eliminate corporate liability? While some think yes,71
liability on non-corporate defendants should not be
advocated as an alternative to corporate liability, but as a
supplement." Otherwise, there is a great danger that no one
will be held accountable for securities fraud.
In short, the securities fraud class action, while by no
means perfect, is a reasonably effective system, particularly
66 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
67 The limitations period is two years from discovery of fraud but not
more than five years from the violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006).
61 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1567-68.
69 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (abolishing aiding and abetting liability in Rule
10b-5 actions) and Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (limiting primary liability against third-party
defendants).
7o See Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1566-72 (describing the dynamics
of settlement between plaintiffs' counsel and the corporate defendant).
"' See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (substance of
Pritchard's proposal). See also Fox, supra note 48, at 279-81.
72 Coffee first states this proposition arguing that "the radical reform
of abolishing corporate liability for second market securities fraud seems
an overly risky step." Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1566. He then
contradicts himself by proposing that the SEC exempt the non-trading
corporate issuer from private liability for money damages under Rule 10b-
5. Id. at 1582-84.
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after the PSLRA reforms, that achieves both compensatory
and deterrence goals.
Finally, some scholars also advance an argument based
on fairness. They again emphasize that, in most cases, the
securities fraud does not increase the corporation's tangible
assets. Accordingly, making the corporate defendant pay for
harms from which it did not profit diminishes corporate
assets and harms the current shareholders. (Again,
advocates of this view tend to overstate the extent of the
harm since most settlements are funded by insurance.)
Shareholders who purchased shares before the class period 3
thus bear the cost of the fraud perpetrated by the
managers. 4 As with some of the previous arguments, this
argument against enterprise liability has broader
applicability than the securities fraud class action.5
Professor Mitchell traces the history of this concern for
the "innocent shareholder" and demonstrates that it has
been a "rallying cry ... against corporate regulation."" He
argues that the view of the "innocent shareholder" as a
passive shareholder in need of protection is at odds with a
model of shareholder activism that treats shareholders as
important players in corporate governance reform.77
Professor Cox also points out that imposing on the
" Coffee argues that these shareholders are likely to be retail
investors pursuing a buy-and-hold strategy, including the company's
employees who invest through their 401(k) plans. Since they are less
likely to have diversified portfolios, the losses occasioned by the fraud
cause more harm to them. Id. at 1559-61.
14 See also Fox, supra note 48, at 280 (stating that current
shareholders are victims of managers' fraud). Some of the current
shareholders may also be members of the plaintiff class, in which case this
is, as discussed supra in notes 42-44 and accompanying text, "pocket-
shifting."
" See generally Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate
Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006).
76 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities "Class-Action" Lawsuits, 2009
Wis. L. REV. 243, 248 (2009).
"' There are, of course, arguments that shareholders are rationally
apathetic because of the "collective action" problem.
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shareholders the cost of managers' misconduct is an accepted
attribute of share ownership and provides them with
incentives to scrutinize the integrity of management in
corporations in which they invest."8 Similarly, Professor
Harvey Goldschmid argues that we want long-term
shareholders to be concerned about the quality of
management.79
Professor Coffee in contrast, while acknowledging that
enterprise liability might enhance monitoring by the
shareholders, believes that it "offends social norms" in this
context.8 0 Tellingly, Professor Coffee apparently disagrees
with himself on whether the corporation should continue to
be a defendant. In the same article, he asserts that "the
radical reform of abolishing corporate liability for secondary
market securities fraud seems an overly risky step"" and
then goes on to propose precisely that! 2
As the preceding discussion should make clear, the
arguments for and against the federal securities fraud class
action involve complexities and uncertainties that defy
"quick and dirty" solutions. The future of the federal
securities class action raises important policy questions that
call for national debate. If, as many argue, compensation
should not be recognized as a rationale for the securities
fraud class action, what impact will that have on the
confidence of the investor, so critical to the operation of an
efficient and fair trading market?83 How do we square the
dismissal of compensation as a rationale with the SEC's
recent authorization to distribute corporate penalties to
compensate injured investors? 4  If over-deterrence is a
problem even after PSLRA, a less drastic solution may be to
78 Cox, supra note 22, at 511.
Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An
Unwise Proposal in an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666 (1996).
" Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1562.
81 Id. at 1566.
82 Id. at 1582-84.
83 Goldschmid, supra note 79, at 666.
84 See Black, supra note 36.
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reduce the amount of liability.85 If the problem is insufficient
deterrence on corporate managers, then the solution may be
to impose more liability on managers in addition to the
corporation. In assessing enterprise liability, how effective
can shareholders be in monitoring the corporate managers
against fraud, and how concerned should we be for passive
shareholders?
We now turn to examine the two proposals that would
allow shareholders to curtail or even eliminate the securities
fraud class action.
III. THE "SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS" PROPOSALS
A. The Arbitration Proposal
In late 2006 to early 2007, three influential reports were
issued addressing concerns about the declining prominence
of the U.S. capital markets in the face of increasing
competition from overseas markets.86 While the reports
identified many factors contributing to this perceived
decline, each identified the costs of regulation and private
enforcement of federal securities laws as significant anti-
competitive factors. Two of them 7 specifically recommended
" Professor Langevoort previously called for caps on damages. See
Langevoort, supra note 45, at 639. Professor Alexander proposed a
penalties-based approach. See Alexander, supra note 39, at 1487.
86 Interim Report, supra note 35 (an independent, bipartisan
committee composed of twenty-two corporate and financial leaders);
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st
Century Report and Recommendations (Mar. 2007) (an independent,
bipartisan commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce);
Bloomberg-Schumer Report, supra note 35 (commissioned by New York
City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles E.
Schumer).
87 Interim Report, supra note 35, at 17-18; Bloomberg-Schumer
Report, supra note 35, at 102-03. See also Cyril Moscow, Arbitration
Bylaws to Bar Shareholder Class Actions, 20 INSIGHTS 8 (2006) (arbitration
of shareholders' derivative claims has been previously proposed). See G.
Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517
(1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory
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that corporations be permitted to amend their certificates of
incorporation to require arbitration of securities fraud
claims. They presented arbitration as an issue of
shareholders' rights: "shareholders should have the right to
choose, particularly given the high cost to shareholders of
litigation."88  Further, "the [SEC] should not force
shareholders to accept the costs that go with class action
securities litigation ... where these shareholders choose to
forgo these rights." 9 It was widely reported that, in response
to these proposals, the SEC planned to publish for public
comment a proposal to permit arbitration. The SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox denied that the agency was
drafting such a proposal, and no such proposal was publicly
released.90
Neither report developed the substance or
implementation of the recommendation in any depth. Their
analysis of several critical issues is superficial. First, they
express indifference as to whether plaintiffs could bring their
federal securities claims as class action arbitrations or would
be limited to individual arbitrations, although this
indifference is likely disingenuous.91 Second, they assume
that Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act presents no obstacle
to shareholders' waiving their right to bring their securities
of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
919 (1988).
' Interim Report, supra note 35, at 18; See also Bloomberg-Schumer
Report, supra note 35, at 103.
89 Interim Report, supra note 35, at 109-110. For an exchange of
views on the SEC's refusal to allow acceleration of a registration
statement because it contained a charter provision mandating arbitration
of shareholder claims, see Carl Schneider, Arbitration in Corporate
Governance Documents: An Idea the SEC Refuses to Accelerate, 8 INSIGHTS
21 (1990) and Thomas L. Riesenberg, Arbitration and Corporate
Governance: A Reply to Carl Schneider, 8 INSIGHTS 2 (1990).
9o See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
81 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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claims in federal court.92 Finally, they assert that notice of
the arbitration provision is sufficient to bind subsequent
purchasers."
B. The Proposal to Eliminate the Corporate Defendant
Although not the first to make the proposal, Professor
Coffee received much attention when he floated the idea of
eliminating the corporate defendant in secondary market
securities fraud class actions. 4 He advocated that the SEC
use its statutory exemptive authority to accomplish this
change.95 Recently, Professor Adam Pritchard advanced a
proposal that, although he phrases it in more technical terms
("partial waiver of the FOTM presumption"), would
effectively accomplish the same result.96 Because he does not
believe that the SEC (or Congress or the Court) would take
this action, Professor Pritchard proposes a self-help measure.
Asserting that Basic's recognition of the FOTM presumption
is the problem, he argues that shareholders can "fix" the
problem themselves through amending the certificate of
incorporation to specify disgorgement as the measure of
damages if plaintiffs invoke the FOTM presumption. 97 In his
view, disgorgement is the appropriate measure of damages
in FOTM cases because deterrence is the principal
justification for allowing securities fraud class actions.9 As a
result, in the typical secondary market case, defendants
would be limited to corporate managers who participated in
the fraud and who received a direct financial gain from the
fraud, as by selling their shares at the inflated price. Only
92 Interim Report, supra note 35, at 110 (asserting there is "little
chance that securities law claims involving the corporate issuer would be
held to be beyond arbitration").
13 Interim Report, supra note 35, at 110-11 (notice of arbitration
provision in corporation's SEC filings and on its website); Bloomberg-
Schumer Report, supra note 35, at 103 (notice provided by broker-dealers).
9 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1582-83.
96 Pritchard, supra note 6, at 248-55.
9' Id. at 255.
98 Id. at 249.
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investors that could establish their own reliance on the
fraudulent misstatements would be able to bring individual
actions against the corporation and recover OOP damages;
presumably only a few institutional investors would be able
to establish reliance and would have a sufficiently large
investment to make maintaining their own actions
financially feasible. 9  Professor Pritchard would allow
successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees. °°
Professor Pritchard provides a more extended analysis of
the legal issues than do the proponents of the arbitration
proposal. Like them, Professor Pritchard asserts that § 29(a)
of the Exchange Act does not prohibit shareholders from
waiving the FOTM presumption'0 1 and that notice of the
waiver is sufficient to bind subsequent purchasers.' 2
Contrary to the assertions of the proponents of both
proposals, I argue (in Part IV) that § 29(a) of the Exchange
Act makes both proposals impermissible under federal
securities law. I make (in Part V) three arguments based on
state law. First, although the proponents of both proposals
apparently did not recognize this, these certificate provisions
are not permitted under state corporate law because they are
"inconsistent" with law. Second, these proposals may be
unfair to current shareholders that do not vote in favor of the
proposals. Third, these proposals may be unenforceable as to
subsequent stock purchasers.
IV. SECTION 29(a) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT (THE
ANTI-WAIVER CLAUSE)
This Part first addresses the legislative history and case
law interpreting § 29(a) as background. It then addresses
" Id. at 224. Pritchard would allow institutional investors to recover
OOP damages if they could prove actual reliance, even though, under his
theory, investors would be overcompensated if they have diversified
portfolios. Id. at 250.
100 Id.
'o1 Id. at 252-54.
102 Id. at 252.
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specific objections under § 29(a) relating to the arbitration
proposal and the proposal to eliminate the corporate
defendant and concludes that neither proposal is
permissible.
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act states that "any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this Chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder. . . shall be void."" 3 In
1934 Congress took this section verbatim from Section 14 of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act),1 °4 which in
turn was derived from Section 10(5) of Great Britain's The
Companies Act. °5 The legislative history is scant,1 6 but this
is not surprising. Congress drafted the provision broadly
and plainly and must have thought it required no
explanation. The investor protections afforded by the statute
and its rules are so important that Congress would not
permit parties to negotiate deals that weakened the
statutory framework. While the congressional purpose may
have been at least partly protective, reflecting a concern that
the more sophisticated party might persuade the less
sophisticated party to give up his rights, Congress also must
have been concerned about the national interest and the
importance of federal regulation for the overall fairness and
effectiveness of the securities market-the fundamental
purpose of the Exchange Act.
103 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2006).
104 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006).
105 That the Securities Act was modeled after The Companies Act is
well-documented. See Seligman, supra note 28, at 46, 53 (1995).
'0' Section 29(a) "was taken verbatim out of the Securities Act," Stock
Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., S. Res. 56 and S.
Res. 97, 73d Cong., Before Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6578 (1934), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1S34 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen. Mahar eds. 2001). The legislative
history of Section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n, is silent as to
the statute's scope. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law
Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 127 n.237 (1985).
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Wilko v. Swan, °7 Shearson /American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,' and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson /American
Express, Inc. °9 are the only Supreme Court opinions that
analyze the anti-waiver provisions in any depth. In these
cases the Court considered whether a provision in a
customer's brokerage agreement that required arbitration of
all disputes was unenforceable with respect to federal
securities claims because of the anti-waiver provision. In
Wilko the Court held that "[als the protective provisions of
the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to
fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress
must have intended § 14 to apply to waiver of judicial trial
and review." 10  Over thirty years later, however, in
McMahon, the Court changed its mind.' In doing so, the
Court's statutory analysis focuses initially on the language
and states that what the statute prohibits is waivers of the
statute's "substantive obligations," which does not include
the provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange
Act claims on the district courts." 2 The Court, however, goes
beyond this cramped reading and identifies the statute's
central purpose: "§ 29(a) is concerned ... with whether the
agreement 'weakens [customers'] ability to recover under the
Exchange Act. 11' 3  The balance of the opinion and
Rodriguez1 4 make clear that this is the judicial concern.
After examining the current state of securities arbitration,
the Court concludes that, contrary to the Wilko court's
107 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
108 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
109 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
... Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437.
. Since McMahon involved § 29(a), the technical overruling did not
occur until Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
112 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added).
"3 Id. at 230 (quoting from Wilko).
... For an insightful comparison of the Court's approaches in
McMahon and Rodriguez see Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The
Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 879, 892-895 (1994).
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"mistrust of arbitration,"115 the process adequately vindicates
customers' rights, principally because of SEC oversight over
the SRO arbitration forums." 6
In the 1990s several circuit courts had occasion to
consider the applicability of § 29(a) to contracts for
underwriting capital between Lloyd's of London and U.S.
residents."7 According to the plaintiffs, Lloyd's solicited U.S.
investors to raise capital and concealed the underwriting
risks and massive liabilities relating to asbestos litigation.
The contracts specified English choice of law and an English
forum for investors' claims, and Lloyd's insisted that
execution of the contracts take place on British soil. While
the choice of forum clause would likely pass muster under
McMahon"8 and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," 9 the plain
meaning of the statute prohibits a clause mandating
application of English law, because such a clause is a
"provision binding any person ... to waive compliance with
any provision of [the] Act."12° The circuit courts, however,
uniformly upheld both the choice of law and choice of forum
clauses on the ground that these were international
transactions among sophisticated investors. The opinions
emphasized the importance of certainty and predictability in
international transactions, 2' as well as respect for
international law. The circuit courts also worried that
115 Id. at 233.
11' Id. at 238; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483.
117 Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
1998) (recognizing it is a "close question," but following the "weight of
circuit authority"); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993);
Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
119 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (upholding an arbitration clause in an
international transaction that the Court assumed involved securities).
121 See Richards, 135 F.3d at 1297-98 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting
section 14 of the Securities Act)
121 Lipcon emphasized the narrowness of its holding by noting that
international agreements were "sui generis," 148 F.3d at 1293. Similarly,
Richards emphasized the importance of certainty and predictability in
international agreements, 135 F.3d at 1293.
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banning the use of these clauses in international contracts
would be an over-extension of U.S. securities laws122-policy
concerns more properly left to Congress. Importantly,
however, the courts recognized that the available English
remedies must be "adequate substitutes" for federal
securities laws. 23  Thus, while these opinions carve out a
questionable exception for international securities contracts
among sophisticated investors, they do not detract from the
McMahon principle that § 29(a) forbids agreements that
weaken investors' protections under federal securities (or
equivalent) laws.
Finally, it is well established that § 29(a) does not permit
provisions that weaken investors' ability to recover under the
federal securities laws, no matter what form they take: "non-
reliance" clauses in stock purchase agreements, 124 "no-action"
clauses in indentures, 25  clauses that provide for an
alternative remedy,"16 or clauses that specify indemnification
as the sole remedy. 27 The only situation where some courts
have enforced non-reliance clauses is in negotiated contracts
among sophisticated investors or corporate insiders where
the written agreement contains specific representations and
the non-reliance clause serves the purpose of barring
122 Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1294-95; Richards, 135 F.3d at 1293.
122 Richards, 135 F.3d. at 1296; Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New York,
153 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1998).
124 See, e.g., AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir.
2003); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (synthetic
trading relationship); Rogen v. Illikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966);
Roll v. Singh, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50125 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008); MBI
Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ'g. Co., 2001 WL 1478812
(W.D. Wis. Sept. 6, 2001).
125 See, e.g., McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044
(2d Cir. 1995); Kusner v. First Penn. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976).
126 See, e.g., Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D.
Minn. 1971).
127 Citibank v. Itochu Int'l, Inc., 2003 WL 1797847 (S°D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
2003).
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representations not contained in the agreement. 12 While the
judiciary's creation of a parole evidence rule exception to §
29(a) is questionable, it is of limited scope. 29
A. The Arbitration Proposal
Some commentators, like the proponents of this proposal,
have mistakenly assumed that McMahon3 ° answers in the
affirmative the question of whether § 29(a) permits contracts
that require arbitration of federal securities fraud claims
against the issuer. 3' Arbitration of a purchaser or seller's
securities fraud claims against the issuer, however, is very
different from arbitration of securities fraud claims between
a customer and his broker or even arbitration of
shareholders' derivative claims.
As an initial matter, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) requires an agreement to arbitrate.'32 In the
customer/broker setting, there is privity of contract in the
traditional contract sense, because brokerage firms require
customers to sign brokerage agreements that contain an
arbitration clause. In contrast, there is no privity of contract
between the issuer and the purchaser of its stock in the
secondary market, and it is doubtful that a certificate of
incorporation containing an arbitration provision is the
required arbitration agreement for purposes of Section 2 of
the FAA. We defer this discussion, however, to Part V and
12' Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (no discussion of
§ 29(a)); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).
12' See Harsco, 91 F.3d at 343 (recognizing that plaintiffs remedies
were weakened, but emphasizing that this was a detailed written
agreement negotiated among sophisticated parties). Harsco was
distinguished in MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co.,
2001 WL 1478812 (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 6, 2001) (distinguishing Harsco
because plaintiffs alleged that they attempted to confirm truth of
agreement's representations, but were "duped" by false answers).
130 See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text.
131 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 90
N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 31, 1990) (stating that the argument distinguishing
McMahon and Rodriguez as limited to broker-dealer disputes "approaches
the frivolous").
132 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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assume there is a contract for purposes of the § 29(a)
analysis.
Apart from the issue of privity, customer/broker claims
are fundamentally different from purchaser/issuer claims. A
customer's dispute with his broker is a private dispute
focusing on the individual broker's alleged failure to live up
to his duties owed to the individual customer, usually under
state securities or common law, but occasionally under
federal securities law as well.133 Moreover, the customer
generally possesses much of the information necessary to
present his claim, both in his account statements and in the
broker's statements (both written and oral) made to the
customer. Whatever additional information the customer
needs can be obtained from the broker through a relatively
uncomplicated discovery process. In this setting, the
traditional advantages of arbitration - lower cost, greater
speed, informality, and confidentiality - may offer value to
the participants. In contrast, securities fraud class actions
allege a fraud on the marketplace, a matter of national
significance that preempts state claims arising from the
same set of facts. 4 The purchaser is not likely to possess
the necessary information to establish a securities fraud
claim. Instead, there is need for a structured discovery
process to balance the purchaser's need for information with
the issuer's need for protection from an abusive "fishing
expedition." Finally, the McMahon court upheld the
arbitration agreement in the customer/broker setting
principally because it had assurance that the customer's
rights would be adequately protected; customer/broker
claims are generally arbitrated in SRO forums whose
procedural rules must be approved by the SEC upon a
finding that they are protective of investors.1" In contrast,
purchaser/issuer claims would be arbitrated before one of the
' For development of the issues discussed in this paragraph, see
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of
Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 991 (2002).
134 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
131 Supra note 116.
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commercial arbitration forums where the SEC has no power
or influence over the adequacy or fairness of its
procedures.136
In short, the traditional advantages of arbitration have
little applicability to purchaser/issuer claims. To the
contrary, there is a need for formality and transparency in
order to meet the goals of the participants and the national
interest. Adjudications, unlike arbitrations, fulfill functions
of deterrence and development of legal standards and satisfy
investors' right to know the laws are being enforced.'37 In
addition, the significant procedural advantages under
PSLRA that Congress constructed for defendants, in order to
achieve the twin goals "to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven
litigation while preserving investors' ability to recover on
meritorious claims, " "' are not readily transferable to the
arbitration forum.139 Finally, arbitration cures none of the
deficiencies in the class action about which its critics
complain. For similar reasons, FINRA, the arbitration
forum for customer disputes with brokers, will not accept
class arbitrations against broker-dealers and requires class
actions to be heard in court. 4 °
136 Many consumer groups believe that the consumer arbitration
process and forums are biased against consumers. Recently, the National
Arbitration Forum agreed to stop arbitrating credit card disputes after
being sued by the Minnesota Attorney-General. Press Release, National
Arbitration Forum, National Arbitration Forum to Cease Administering
All Consumer Arbitrations in Response to Mounting Legal and Legislative
Challenges (July 19, 2009), available at http://www.adrforum.com
/print.aspx?itemlD=1528. The American Arbitration Association
announced it would stop arbitrating consumer debt collection claims until
the process was reformed. Press Release, American Arbitration
Association, AAA Announces Moratorium on Consumer Debt Collection
Arbitration Cases (July 27, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?i
d=36432&printable=true.
137 Jennifer J. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of
Shareholder Claims, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 181, 193-96 (2008).
138 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
139 See Johnson & Brunet, supra note 137, at 197.
140 FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES
RULE 12204(a), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-
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Do these significant distinctions between customer/broker
and purchaser/issuer claims mean that the Court would not
apply McMahon in the latter setting? Although securities
fraud class arbitration is the antithesis of the fast, simple
and inexpensive alternative to litigation that arbitration was
originally intended to provide, it is unlikely that courts
would preclude securities fraud class arbitrations because of
the complexity of the claims.' The Court, with its pro-
arbitration policy and zeal to remove cases from the federal
dockets,' consistently rejects objections that federal
statutory claims involving questions of national importance
are not suitable for arbitration."3 Similarly, the arguments
that Congress legislated specific judicial procedures for
securities fraud actions or that McMahon should be limited
to claims filed in an SRO forum are unlikely to persuade
courts that the purchaser/issuer claims cannot be brought in
arbitration. If there is an agreement to arbitrate,144 the
Court's approach is to enforce it; it is indifferent if the
parties select the less optimal forum. Accordingly, as to the
broad question of whether § 29(a) bars agreements to
main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=4110. FINRA does not permit class
arbitrations because they are incompatible with the virtue of arbitration
as a relatively quick and inexpensive dispute resolution process.
141 See JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 181 (2d Cir.
2004) (rejecting argument that antitrust claims were beyond the
capabilities of an arbitral panel). But see In re Am. Express Merchants'.
Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 310 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009) (observing that the argument
that class arbitrations are incompatible with the FAA was "intriguing").
142 See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why
Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 415
(2003) (describing McMahon as the perfect alignment of two strong
Supreme Court policies: support for arbitration and antipathy toward
investors' claims in federal court).
' Besides McMahon, which approved arbitration of both securities
and RICO claims, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (approving arbitration in antitrust
claim) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(approving arbitration in age discrimination claim).
144 Just a reminder that we have not answered this question yet.
No. 3:802] SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER THE RADAR
HeinOnline -- 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 831 2009
arbitrate federal securities claims against issuers, the
answer may be no, not necessarily.
The analysis of the § 29(a) issue, however, does not end
here. Despite the proponents' professed agnosticism on the
class arbitration issue, I suspect that defeating class actions
is a primary motivating factor in the arbitration proposal.
PSLRA's legal procedures are so advantageous to defendants
that it is bizarre that defendants would prefer arbitration
where legal requirements may not be so strictly enforced"'
unless their objective is to eliminate class proceedings.
Eliminating class arbitration would be a significant
advantage for corporate defendants because if investors
could not aggregate their claims, few investors would suffer
losses of sufficient magnitude to make arbitration cost-
effective. Eliminating class arbitration would both seriously
weaken investors' ability to recover and reduce the deterrent
effect of the private remedy. Thus, the proponents' professed
indifference to this question appears disingenuous. If my
suspicions are correct, the issue under § 29(a) can be more
precisely framed as whether an arbitration agreement that
does not permit class arbitration is enforceable.
Some corporate defendants have asserted that the nature
of arbitration is antithetical to class action, that arbitration,
by definition, is an informal dispute resolution process to
resolve individual disputes, and that this notion of
arbitration is embedded in the FAA. '46 Under this view, an
arbitration clause that does not explicitly allow class
arbitration bars it. This view of arbitration, and its reliance
on the consensual model of the FAA, strikes me as at odds
with the widespread acceptance of arbitration clauses in
' See Johnson & Brunet, supra note 137, at 197 (stating that the
procedural protections against vexatious lawsuits would not apply in
arbitration).
146 The Supreme Court will hear a case this term which presents the
question of whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose
arbitration clauses are silent on that issue is consistent with the Federal
Arbitration Act. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85
(2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (U.S. June 15, 2009) (No.
08-1198).
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standard-form contracts.'47  If this argument has any
persuasive power, however, it might be good strategy for a
corporation seeking to include an arbitration provision in its
certificate of incorporation to draft a simple arbitration
clause that does not address class arbitration, with the hope
that shareholders may not recognize the full implications of
the provision until the corporation later seeks to prevent a
class arbitration.
Alternatively, a corporation seeking to include an
arbitration provision in its certificate of incorporation may
prefer lack of ambiguity and draft the provision explicitly to
bar class arbitration. Today, many sellers of products and
services include arbitration provisions that preclude class
arbitrations.'48 Plaintiffs have challenged these bans on
collective action under a number of theories, and "the
wisdom and utility of these provisions have become the
subject of intense debate."'49 While, initially, most courts
upheld class arbitration waivers,"15 recently the highest
courts of some states and some federal appellate courts
(applying state law) have declared that class arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts may be unenforceable, either
because they are contrary to public policy'5' or because they
147 See Feeney v. Dell, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 765 (Mass. 2009)
(rejecting defendants' argument that a prohibition on class arbitration is
"inherent" in an agreement to arbitrate). Petitioners in JLM Industries,
Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004), distinguish their case,
an agreement among commercial parties operating in the same industry,
from consumer contracts of adhesion. Petitioner's Brief, Stolt-Nielsen SA,
at 14.
148 See generally Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 373 (2005).
141 In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 303 (2d Cir.
2009).
15o For a compilation of cases rejecting the unconscionability analysis,
see Gilles supra note 148, at 400 n.139.
11 Feeney, 908 N.E.2d at 761; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100, 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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are unconscionable.152  These courts focus on whether
enforcing the class arbitration waiver will operate, as a
practical matter, to prevent small claimants from vindicating
their statutory rights.
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph15 3 provides a
basis for challenging class action waivers under the FAA. In
that case, the Court stated that "[i]t may well be that the
existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant.., from effectively vindicating her federal statutory
rights in the arbitral forum."'54 Subsequent courts have
acknowledged that excessive costs can make the arbitration
remedy, in fact, illusory and prevent plaintiffs from
vindicating their rights, so that arbitration is no longer "a
valid alternative to traditional litigation."'5  In In re
American Express Merchants' Litigation,'56  the Second
Circuit held that, in the context of the particular dispute
before the court, the class action waiver clause was
unenforceable because it would effectively preclude
individual plaintiffs, merchants that accepted defendant's
credit cards, from vindicating their statutory rights under
federal antitrust law.15 7  Plaintiffs were able to prevail
because of a financial consulting firm's affidavit that
estimated the cost of an expert study concerning liability and
damages relating to an antitrust tie-in claim and compared
it with the potential recovery by an individual plaintiff. The
152 Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2009)
(applying New Jersey law); Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, 560 F.3d 1087, 1097
(9th Cir. 2009) (applying Oregon law).
153 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
154 Id. at 90.
155 See, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.
2009) (quoting Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2006)).
See also Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8"1 Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that excessive fees may prevent vindication of statutory
rights); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (11th Cir.
2003).
156 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W.
3670 (U.S. May 29, 2009) (No. 08-1473).
... The court recognized the issue, but did not address whether class
arbitrations are ever incompatible with the FAA.
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economist concluded that "it would not be worthwhile" for a
plaintiff to pursue an individual claim in light of these high
costs and the small amount of individual damages.15 In
addition, the court found that the statutory trebling of
damages and payment of costs, including attorneys' fees, did
not solve the problem of a potential small recovery relative to
certain large costs.159 Accordingly, the court agreed with
plaintiffs that the class action waiver "flatly ensures that no
small merchant may challenge American Express's tying
arrangements under the federal antitrust laws,""1 ' a
troubling outcome because "private suits provide a
significant supplement to the limited resources available to
the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws
and deterring violations."16
In the context of securities fraud class arbitration, the
Second Circuit's analysis in In Re American Express
Merchants' Litigation is even more compelling because of §
29(a). The costs of proving a federal securities fraud claim in
arbitration-including falsity, materiality, efficient market,
scienter, causation and OOP damages 162 -would be so large
as to make pursuing an individual claim infeasible except
possibly for large investors that have suffered significant
losses. Accordingly, unless the claims could be brought as
class arbitrations, there is, as a practical matter, no remedy
for investors with small holdings. A class action waiver in
this context is the equivalent of a waiver of investor
protections prohibited by § 29(a).
... In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 317 (2d Cir.
2009).
159 Id. at 318. See also Feeny v. Dell, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 764 (Mass.
2009) (rejecting defendant's argument that the statutory availability of
attorneys' fees, damages and multiple damages would provide sufficient
incentives to pursue small claims individually).
10 In reAm. Express Merchants'Litig., 554 F.3d at 319.
161 Id.
162 Dura Pharmas., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
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B. The Proposal to Eliminate the Corporate Defendant
Recall that Professor Pritchard's proposal limits recovery
to disgorgement if plaintiffs invoke the FOTM presumption
of reliance in securities fraud class actions.163 His proposal is
not only, as he labels it, a partial waiver of the FOTM
presumption of reliance that limits plaintiffs' recovery, but
also operates to eliminate the corporate defendant in most
instances. There can be no doubt that this waiver of reliance
is impermissible under § 29(a). As the earlier discussion
explains, both the Securities and Exchange Acts, from their
initial enactment, have forbidden private parties to adopt
measures that weaken investors' protections, especially their
ability to recover damages, under the federal statutory
framework.16 There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statutory language, and courts have consistently struck
down non-reliance clauses in securities contracts 165 as
violative of § 29(a). Congress made the decision that the
statutory protections are so important to individual investors
and the marketplace as a whole that there is no place for
"self-help" measures that curtail the statutory remedies.
Professor Pritchard offers two arguments as to why §
29(a) should not render his partial waiver of the FOTM
presumption proposal unenforceable. Both are unconvincing.
First, he argues that his proposal does not excuse compliance
with the antifraud provision, but merely alters the remedy. 66
This argument is disingenuous; the purpose and effect of his
proposal are to eliminate, in most cases, the principal
defendant in securities fraud class actions and the only
defendant likely to be able to pay substantial damages.
16 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 103-129 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
166 Pritchard, supra note 6, at 253. See also Adam Pritchard, Can
Shareholders Waive the Fraud-on-the-market Presumption of Reliance?,
SECURITIES DOCKET, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2008/11/17/guest-column-can-shareholder
s-waive-the-fraud-on-the-market-presumption-of-reliance (expanding on
his analysis in a blog column).
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Moreover, even as to other defendants, his proposal limits
recovery to disgorgement of gains, an amount that may, in
many cases, be, insufficient to make bringing these cases
worthwhile. As discussed earlier, waivers of class actions
should be impermissible under § 29(a) because the costs of
bringing securities fraud actions make claims brought by
small investors financially infeasible.167  Similarly, in
instances where plaintiffs cannot establish that individual
defendants directly benefited from their fraud, the likely
recovery may not be large enough to make pursuing the
remedy cost-effective. In both these situations, the award of
attorneys' fees does not cure this problem.'68 As a result, the
practical effect will be to excuse compliance with the
antifraud provisions. Perpetrators of securities fraud should
not have a free pass because, although they may have caused
considerable losses to investors, they themselves did not
receive much direct benefit from their fraud.
Second, Professor Pritchard argues that his proposal does
not violate § 29(a) because the FOTM presumption of
reliance is merely a "procedural device, created by the courts,
not Congress."'69 The caselaw establishes that waivers of
reliance present precisely the kind of danger that concerned
Congress when it initially enacted the statute. 7 ° Finally,
Professor Pritchard's dismissive treatment of the FOTM
presumption ignores the fact that Congress itself recognized
the FOTM presumption and its importance when it reformed
the securities fraud class action in PSLRA.'
17
This Part IV demonstrates that both "self-help" proposals
violate § 29(a) and thus are impermissible as a matter of
federal securities law. Part V explains why these proposals
are also impermissible under state law.
.67 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169 Pritchard, supra note 6, at 253-54.
170 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
1' See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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V. LEGALITY, FAIRNESS, AND ENFORCEABILITY
UNDER STATE LAW
A. Legality
Proponents of these proposals assume that state law
permits inclusion of these provisions in a corporation's
certificate of incorporation. However, while modern
corporation statutes allow great flexibility and private
ordering, the discretion of corporate managers and
shareholders to modify the corporation to include any
provision that serves their needs is not unlimited.172 A
corporation's certificate of incorporation may contain
provisions that limit the stockholders' powers only so long as
they are "not inconsistent" with law.173 As stated by the
Delaware Supreme Court, the "broad powers conferred by
[the statute] do not authorize the stockholders to contract
with each other or with the corporation to achieve a result
forbidden by settled rules of public policy."'74  Thus, for
example, courts have invalidated charter provisions that
gave the board of directors the power to deny a stockholder
the right to examine books and records,175 that conferred
lifetime appointments on directors and officers,'76 and that
permitted a majority of shares to ratify the issuance of stock
options without consideration.'77 The Delaware Supreme
172 For example, would anyone seriously argue that a public
corporation's charter provision could prohibit public shareholders from
owning stock in a competitor?
173 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(iii) (2002). See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2009) ("not contrary to the laws of this State").
Fletcher, CORPORATIONS § 150 (2009). ("All optional provisions must be
lawful and cannot be contrary to public policy")
174 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952).
175 State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 259 (Del.
1926).
176 State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 67 N.E. 207, 211 (Ind. Ct. App.
1903). Cf Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 F. 717, 725 (C.C.W.D. V.A. 1905)
(upholding charter provision that shareholders could not vote for a
specified "start-up" time).
177 Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1956).
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Court recognized the necessarily amorphous quality of this
standard, 178 but rather than attempt a definition of "public
policy," it explained that charter provisions could not
"transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy settled
by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation
Law itself."'79 While none of the reported cases involves a
clash between a federal statute and a charter provision, 8 '
there is nothing in the Delaware opinions to suggest that
considerations of public policy are limited to state law, as
Professor Pritchard believes.' 8 ' Indeed, under preemption
principles, charter provisions that violate the anti-waiver
clause of the federal securities laws must be violative of
public policy and impermissible under state law.
B. Fairness
Even if the charter provisions were legal under state law,
there is a serious question of fairness about taking away
rights from current shareholders that do not assent to the
provision. If the managers and controlling shareholders
include such a provision in the corporate charter prior to the
company's initial public offering, it is likely that all current
shareholders have agreed to the provision."' With respect to
established public corporations, however, proponents assume
that both proposals can be adopted through amendment of
178 Sterling, 93 A.2d at 118 (stating that "the limits of 'public policy'
are ill-defined and changing").
179 Id. For a recent example following Sterling, see Jones Apparel
Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 853 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(upholding a charter provision that established the record date for consent
solicitations).
180 While Maxwell Shoe states that a charter provision should be set
aside only for transgressions of "a mandatory rule of our corporate code or
common law," 883 A.2d at 846, the analysis should be equally applicable to
transgressions of a preemptive federal statute.
181 Pritchard, supra note 6, at 252.
182 Coffee, Jr., supra note 87, at 924 (distinguishing between initial
and midstream changes in corporate governance rules).
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the certificate of incorporation by majority vote."8 3 What
about current shareholders that do not vote in favor of the
amendment? Can their rights to bring federal securities
class actions be substantially restricted without their assent?
If they object to giving up their rights, are they relegated to
selling their shares in the open market, perhaps at a reduced
price reflecting the diminishment of their rights?84
It is true that modern corporate law, with its emphasis on
flexibility and adaptability to change, allows substantial
alteration, even elimination, of shareholder rights without
their consent, as exemplified by the demise of the "vested
rights" doctrine. 8 However, the power of the shareholders
holding a majority of the vote to alter corporate governance
and stock ownership rules is not absolute. Thus, for
example, majority shareholders will not be able to adopt a
provision that eliminates the board of directors,1 86 because
minority shareholders cannot be deprived of the protections
afforded by a board of directors with fiduciary
responsibilities to the corporation.
Some legislatures recognize the harshness that results
from the flexibility afforded by modern corporate law and
grant appraisal rights to shareholders whose rights are
183 It may be a majority of the outstanding shares, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2009), or as few shares as a majority of a majority of
shares, see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03(e) (1984), depending on state
law requirements.
184 Proponents will argue that it is more likely that share prices will
go up, reflecting the savings achieved through limiting litigation. How the
market will react is a matter of speculation, but at least for the first
corporations that adopt one of these provisions we might expect a price
decline reflecting market uncertainty because of the novelty.
18' See Barbara Black, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND STOCK REPURCHASES
§ 5:4 (Supp. 2008) (reviewing demise of "vested rights" doctrine relating to
defeasance of shareholders' preferential rights).
186 In Delaware a statutorily defined "close corporation" may provide
for management by the shareholders if all the incorporators or
shareholders agree to it and notice of the provision is conspicuously noted
on the stock certificates. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2009). See also
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984) (a similar provision under which the
agreement ceases to be effective when the corporation becomes public).
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adversely affected by changes they vote against.'87  In
addition, courts may provide protection on fairness or
fiduciary duty grounds, l"8 particularly where the alteration is
not a "plain-vanilla" corporate governance provision, but
goes to personal attributes of stock ownership."9
The proponents have not satisfactorily addressed this
fairness issue. One proponent of the arbitration proposal, at
least, recognized that the rights of dissenting shareholders
need to be addressed; 9 ° another proponent of arbitration
suggests an unworkable solution of prospective
application. 9' Professor Pritchard does not address the
impact on current shareholders of the proposal to eliminate
the corporate defendant. Fairness requires that, at a
minimum, current shareholders should have appraisal rights
if they dissent from the adoption of these proposals.
C. Enforceability
Assuming that these charter provisions are legal and
current shareholders that dissent from the provision are
treated fairly, is either provision enforceable as to
subsequent stock owners? Proponents assert that notice on
the corporate website and in its SEC filings is sufficient to
bind future shareholders. 92 This is, however, a questionable
assertion under both contract and corporate law. The
187 See, e.g., NEW YORK Bus. CORP. LAW § 806(b)(6) (2009) (providing
appraisal rights to shares adversely affected by certain charter
amendments).
188 See, e.g., Dental v. Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 539 P.2d 649, 651
(Or. 1975) (recognizing that even with decline of vested rights, courts have
not held that shareholders can lose all rights).
189 See Black v. Glass, 438 So. 2d 1359, 1371 (Ala. 1983) (striking
down a bylaw that did not simply regulate the conduct of internal affairs,
but instead allocated property rights among shareholders).
190 Bloomberg-Schumer Report, supra note 35, at 103.
191 Moscow, supra note 87, at 9.
192 Interim Report, supra note 35, at 111. See also Pritchard, supra
note 6, at 252. Cf Bloomberg-Schumer Report, supra note 35, at 103
(proposing that brokers provide notice to their customers).
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following discussion focuses first on the arbitration proposal
and the requirement of an agreement under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). It then addresses the proposal to
eliminate the corporate defendant under corporate law.
Finally, the issue of notice is specifically addressed.
1. The Arbitration Proposal
The Congressional purpose in enacting the FAA was to
remove the anti-arbitration bias in federal courts.'93
Accordingly, FAA § 2 states that arbitration agreements are
enforceable to the same extent as other contracts.194 Over
the years, the Court has transformed the FAA into an
expression of "pro-arbitration" policy,'95 but, even so, by
definition, an arbitration agreement between the corporation
and all its current and future shareholders is required. Is
the corporate charter containing an arbitration provision a
contract for purposes of FAA § 2?
Corporate law theory does repeatedly refer to the
corporate charter as a contract among the corporation and
its shareholders. 96 Indeed, many corporate law scholars
view the corporation as nothing more than a variety of
contractual relationships between the various
stakeholders.' 9 ' For these scholars, the question of whether
the certificate of incorporation is a contract for purposes of
FAA § 2 is easily answered in the affirmative. A corporate
law metaphor, however, does not make the certificate of
incorporation the equivalent of the commercial contract
"' See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-62
(1996) (explaining how the Court created the myth of favoritism for
arbitration).
194 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
'9 Sternlight, supra note 193, at 660-62.
196 Shell, supra note 87, at 543 n.172 (citing sources).
17 "[The firm] is simply a legal fiction that encompasses a set of
contractual relations." STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS § 1.5, at 26 (2002).
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contemplated by the FAA,19 and the demise of the "vested
rights" doctrine'99 established that contract law principles
are not grafted onto corporate law with full force and effect.
Arbitration of shareholders' disputes in closely held
corporations has long been generally accepted,200 but in those
instances the arbitration clause is typically found in an
actual agreement entered into by all the shareholders.2 10' To
extend the concept of an agreement under FAA § 2 to include
the certificate of incorporation of a corporation with a small
number of shareholders, all of whom are actively engaged in
the business, may not stretch the definition of a commercial
contract very far, although a recent federal appellate court,
applying Pennsylvania law, refused to enforce an arbitration
provision contained in a professional corporation's bylaws
against a shareholder who did not assent to it. 20 2  In the
context of public corporations, treating the certificate of
incorporation as an actual contract among all current and
future shareholders is pressing the metaphor too far.2 3
Professor G. Richard Shell, in his careful examination of
the legality of arbitration clauses in the context of
shareholders' derivative actions,2 4 thought a better analogy
198 See Shell, supra note 87, at 543 n.170 (reviewing the legislative
history).
199 See Black, supra note 185 and accompanying text.
200 See Shell, supra note 87, at 528-33 (discussing the New York
experience).
201 Id. at 528 n.80.
202 Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d
Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to certify the question, because "it exposed tension between corporate law
principles and arbitration contract principles"; the state court denied the
petition.
203 A recent survey found a small number of foreign issuers whose
stock is traded in the U.S. markets with clauses in their certificates of
incorporation mandating arbitration of intracorporate disputes; see
Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in Public Company Charters: An
Expansion of ADR Elysian Fields or a Descent into Hades?, 18 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 371, 389-90 (2007).
204 Shell, supra note 87, at 528 (1989). It should be noted that the
arguments in favor of arbitration in shareholders' derivative actions are
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is found in cases where members of an association, such as a
stock exchange,"' are bound by an arbitration clause in the
association's governing documents which serve as a
constitution.2"6 However, as Professor Shell acknowledges,
consent to the terms contained in the association's governing
document is more naturally implied where the participants
are members of a common trade or profession and the
document sets forth norms by which the members agree to
abide. In contrast, shareholders in publicly held
corporations "share no common ground other than their
investment preference."2 7 Accordingly, the presence of an
arbitration provision in the certificate of incorporation alone
does not constitute an "arbitration agreement" for purposes
of FAA § 2.
2. The Proposal to Eliminate the Corporate
Defendant
As discussed earlier,20 8  unlike contract law, which
requires a party's assent to be bound to the terms, modern
corporate law promotes flexibility and adaptability by
permitting most changes to corporate governance rules, and
even changes in the attributes of stock ownership, by less
than unanimous consent of the current shareholders. In
addition, the changes are binding on subsequent purchasers;
the cases routinely state that purchasers of stock take with
stronger than in securities fraud class actions, since in the former
plaintiffs must be shareholders at the time of bringing the suit and the
complaint is based on a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
and its shareholders, while in the latter plaintiffs need only be purchasers
or sellers during the period that the fraud tainted the stock price and the
fraud is inflicted on the traders in the market. See Ralph C. Ferrara &
Danny Ertel, BEYOND ARBITRATION: DESIGNING ALTERNATIVES TO
SECURITIES LITIGATION 184-88 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 485 (1987).
206 Shell, supra note 87, at 546-547.
207 Id. at 547.
208 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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notice of the contents of the certificate of incorporation." 9
Although his discussion on this point is abbreviated,
Professor Pritchard appears to rely on this principle.21 °
The power of the current majority to bind all subsequent
holders, however, has its limits; some alterations require the
consent of, or at least notice to, subsequent shareholders to
bind them. Courts are generally more likely to see the value
of flexibility in alterations of corporate governance
provisions, but to be more protective of subsequent
shareholders in alterations to personal attributes of stock
ownership.21' Accordingly, corporate governance provisions
affecting the allocation of powers among the corporation's
board of directors, officers and shareholders are the types of
provisions where, in most instances, changes will bind future
shareholders who do not have notice of the change. Bylaw
amendments requiring a majority vote to elect directors in
uncontested elections212 or limiting the term of any director
who receives more votes against than for his election213 are
popular and recent examples of alterations of corporate
governance rules that will bind all shareholders when
adopted by the requisite percentage of shareholder votes.
More generally, supermajority voting requirements for both
board and shareholder action can be adopted by less than
209 See, e.g., Goldbloss v. Reiman, 55 F. Supp. 811, 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 240 N.W. 671, 674 (Iowa 1932).
210 See Pritchard, supra note 6, at 252 n.126 (citing In re Appraisal of
Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973 (Del. Ch. 1977), where
the court enforced a provision in the certificate of incorporation stipulating
the fair value of preferred stock in an appraisal proceeding, even though
there was no evidence that the current holders agreed to the provision or
even knew of it).
211 1 recognize that the distinction is a blurred one - e.g., dividend
arrearages on preferred shares that fueled the "vested rights" debate. See
supra note 185 and accompanying text.
212 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2009).
21 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22.
No. 3:802]
HeinOnline -- 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 845 2009
unanimous vote and are binding on all current and future
shareholders.214
However, the power of the shareholders holding a
majority of the vote to bind subsequent holders to corporate
governance rules is not unlimited. Some changes so
fundamentally alter the corporate governance structure as to
require special protections for subsequent shareholders. As
discussed previously, an example is a provision that
eliminates the board of directors and replaces it with
management by the shareholders.21 This provision requires
not only the unanimous approval of the current
shareholders, but also conspicuous notice on the stock
certificate to bind all future shareholders. In addition, only
non-public corporations can adopt this radical change, in
recognition of the fact that a corporation whose corporate
governance structure lies so far outside the customary norm
may mislead subsequent shareholders and a notice
requirement is not sufficient warning.
Like corporate governance changes, many charter
provisions relating to the terms of shares, including rights,
qualifications, limitations, and restrictions,216 are binding on
all current shareholders,217 and no notice is required to bind
subsequent owners.21 Some alterations to attributes of stock
ownership, however, are so contrary to the customary
understanding of property rights that they cannot bind
future shareholders unless they either agree or at least take
the stock with notice. A restriction on transferability is the
214 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2009) (shareholder quorum and vote);
Id. at § 141(b) (board quorum and vote); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.27
(shareholder quorum and vote); Id. at § 8.24 (board quorum and vote).
215 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2009); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
6.01.
217 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2009); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
10.03(e).
218 See, e.g, In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698
A.2d 973, 975-76 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that preferred shares can
stipulate the fair value of the shares for appraisal, while Chancellor Allen
speaks of the preferred shareholders' "contracting away" their rights, the
plaintiffs purchased the shares on the secondary market).
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most common example.21  The power to transfer stock
ownership is considered a traditional property right; while
perhaps the corporation statute could define stock ownership
differently from other types of personal property and include
prohibitions on transfer among the limitations and
restrictions permitted in the certificate of incorporation's
statement of the stock terms, no state has chosen to do so.
Thus, while the statutes do not limit restrictions on
transferability to closely held corporations, it is unlikely that
restrictions on transferability applicable to all shareholders
would either be feasible or upheld by the courts once the
corporation's shareholder base reached a certain size.
Admittedly, the distinction between corporate governance
rules and rules relating to attributes of stock ownership is
blurred. Nevertheless, provisions that purport to restrict a
current or former shareholder's right to bring federal
securities fraud class actions do not have much bearing on
the allocation of power between shareholders and directors,
except to the extent that current shareholders' power to sue
management may strengthen their position within the
corporation. A provision that requires a majority vote to
elect directors in uncontested elections does not have much
in common with a provision that restricts the power of a
former shareholder to sue the corporation and its managers
for lying to the marketplace. Rather, the right to sue is more
closely related to an attribute of stock ownership,
particularly in securities fraud class actions, where (unlike
shareholders' derivative actions)22 ° standing is conferred not
on shareholders, but on purchasers or sellers.221
219 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 2009), MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
6.27. Moreover, the statutes require a legitimate corporate purpose for the
restriction.
220 Indeed, since a derivative claim involves the corporation's right to
sue, it may have already agreed to arbitrate certain disputes, and such an
agreement may be binding on the shareholders. See Jerry A. Sanborn, The
Rise of "Shareholder Derivative Arbitration" in Public Corporations: In re
Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
337 (1996) (discussing a derivative suit involving alleged malfeasance
committed by corporate employees of a securities firm, where defendants
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Indeed, proponents of both the arbitration proposal and
the proposal to eliminate the corporate defendant
acknowledge that fairness requires some kind of public
notice,222 indicating that they do not believe that the reliance
on corporate law principles is compelling. Accordingly, we
address now the question of notice.
3. Notice
Even though we have shown that there is serious doubt
that either proposal could be enforced under contract or
corporate law principles, it is true that, in an era of
standardized form contracts and internet transactions,
modern commercial law has moved, in the name of efficiency,
from an assent model to a notice model of contract
formation.223 In the law governing commercial transactions,
there are many decisions holding that where the purchaser
of a product or service receives notice of the seller's terms
and has an opportunity to reject the product or service, a
contract is created on the seller's terms.224 In addition, the
trading markets bear some similarity to auctions, and the
longstanding law regarding auctions establishes the
principle that bids at an auction embody terms made by
advertisement, posting or other publication, whether or not
the bidder is aware of them.225 Finally, since the plaintiffs
rely on the FOTM presumption to maintain these class
actions, it may be inconsistent for them to argue that a
public notice cannot bind them. Accordingly, it may be that
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to agreements with the New York
Stock Exchange).
121 Corporate statutes authorize charter amendments to eliminate
directors' liability for duty of care breaches. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2009). Otherwise, it is doubtful that a majority of shareholders
could take this action.
222 See supra notes 93, 102 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
224 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir.
2004) (citing Jones v. Brisbin, 41 Wn.2d 167 (Wash. 1952)); Gateway 2000,
105 F.3d 1147; ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
225 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 28(2) (1981).
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the ultimate issue as to the enforceability of both proposals
is what kind of notice is required so that it is fair to bind
subsequent stock purchasers.
It would be difficult to provide actual notice at the time of
the sale. In an earlier era of corporate law, where
shareholders typically received stock certificates, notice
requirements were easily met; the provisions could be
printed on the certificate, as is still the case with respect to
closely held corporations. Purchasers do receive
confirmations that could contain notice of the provisions, but
requiring the broker-dealer to ascertain the existence of the
terms and include the notice on the confirmation would
impose a considerable burden on them. A generic statement
on brokerage statements that some issuers may include such
provisions should not be sufficient to constitute fair notice.
Proponents assert that, in lieu of actual notice at the time
of sale, notice on the corporate website or in the corporation's
SEC filings (which, in many instances, the corporation no
longer has to deliver to the shareholders)226 is sufficient to
bind subsequent purchasers.227 Commercial law, however,
does not support this assertion. Of critical importance in the
commercial cases is that the purchaser, at a minimum,
receives actual notice of the existence of the terms, either in
a physical document or online, in sufficient time to renounce
the transaction; 228 "clarity and conspicuousness ... are
important in securing informed assent."229 Thus, in Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp.,23° the Second Circuit said it
would not enforce an arbitration clause where individuals
could download a plug-in program from defendant's website
without first viewing defendant's license agreement
containing the arbitration agreement. Importantly, "inquiry
226 SEC, Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148
(Jan. 29, 2007).
227 See supra notes 93, 102 and accompanying text.
228 Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir.
2002).
229 Id. at 32.
230 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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notice" was not created even though plaintiffs would only
have to scroll down to a screen located below the download
button. Notice in the corporation's SEC filings and its
corporate website is not sufficient notice under Specht,
because the purchaser would have to engage in more of a
search to determine the existence of the provision than the
website visitors in Specht had to do.
Proponents do have better support for their notice
argument in the auction cases. Because of the special nature
of auctions, the law imposes a greater responsibility on
bidders to ascertain the terms of the sale, and they will be
bound by publicized terms of which they should be aware,23'
in recognition of the fact that auctions are "cost-saving
device[s] in which face-to-face negotiations, except as to
price, are not engaged in by the parties." 32 Thus, the court
in Hessel v. Christie's, Inc.23 3 thought it likely that the bidder
would be bound by the terms contained in the auction
house's catalog even if he did not receive it, because he
should have inquired into the terms of the sale. In that case,
the court noted that (1) the auction house's customary
practice was to post on its website, below the description of
the items up for auction, the words "important notice;" (2)
when the viewer clicked on those words, a notice appeared
stating that the terms and conditions of the sale were set
forth in the catalogue and that it was the viewer's
responsibility to inform himself of the terms; (3) the bidder
had visited the website prior to the auction; and (4) the
bidder was an experienced art purchaser who had purchased
art many times before from the auction house. 34 In short,
courts assume that participants in auctions should know the
rules of the game.
The proponents essentially argue that, like bidders at an
auction, stock traders should know the rules of the game and
be familiar with information posted on the corporation's
231 Hessel v. Christie's, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
232 Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 759 P.2d 418, 422
(Wash. 1988).
23.3 399 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
234 Id. at 515-16.
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website and in its SEC filings. Unlike auctions, however,
there is no expectation that purchasers review the corporate
information before making stock purchases. For most
investors, this is simply a waste of time; they should either
rely on the market to price the stock or rely on the
recommendation of their broker or investment adviser. 5
Furthermore, unless and until adoption of these provisions
becomes widespread, it would be unfair to charge even
sophisticated traders with knowledge of these provisions.236
It is true, however, that the FOTM theory presumes that all
public information about the corporation is embedded in the
stock price. Thus, to the extent the limitation is impacted in
the stock price, the purchasers may be bound by the
provision. To challenge it may undermine their reliance
argument.
To summarize: Even if the arbitration proposal and the
proposal to eliminate the corporate defendant were not
impermissible under § 29(a), they are certainly illegal, and
may also be unfair and unenforceable, under state law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Securities fraud class actions play an important role in
compensating investors and deterring corporate fraud.
When Congress reformed the securities class action in
PSLRA and decided not to eliminate the FOTM presumption,
it reaffirmed their importance. This is not to say that there
is no place for further reform. The critics of the federal
securities class action raise important policy questions that
have serious consequences for the U.S. securities markets.
The nation is currently debating what may possibly be the
most significant regulatory reform to our financial markets
... See Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-
Based Approach, 88 CAL. L. REv. 279 (2000) (arguing that unsophisticated
investors should be permitted only to purchase index funds).
236 See Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that daily user of website who admitted to knowing the terms of its use
could be bound by them even though he never manifested his assent to the
terms).
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since the 1930s. The SEC should exercise a leadership role
in considering whether further reform to the securities fraud
class action is advisable and convene a broadly inclusive
national discussion on this subject."' There is no place for
self-help measures advanced in the name of shareholders'
rights.
237 See supra note 10.
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